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QuenchWorks

step-issuer

Image · Security & supply chain · standard · v0.12.0

D 11cosign signedSPDX SBOMSLSA provenanceamd64 · arm64Rebuilt 2026-10-22

step-issuer, smallstep's cert-manager external issuer. StepIssuer and StepClusterIssuer resources sign cert-manager CertificateRequests through a step-ca JWK provisioner. Static Go from the tagged source.

Version

The latest line lives at the base page; older lines have their own page so you can pin and verify exactly that version.

Current digest (deployed by the chart)

sha256:ac6d6d22427cade688de44630af0b9ed721b245cb8fef98f507c6ec072024226

Signatures, the SBOM, and provenance all attach to this digest. Pin to it for reproducible, tamper-evident pulls.

Signed
cosign keyless
SBOM
SPDX, on digest
Provenance
SLSA build
Architectures
amd64, arm64
Runs as
nonroot (uid 1001)
Root filesystem
read-only
Image size
18.4 MB

Published versions

3 tags

Each tag is a multi-arch index (amd64 + arm64) pinned by digest. Tagged by version, never :latest.

VersionSizePublishedDigest
0.12.0latest18.4 MB2026-10-22sha256:ac6d6d22427c…
0.11.018.4 MB2026-10-22sha256:dd92d0e0c4ca…
0.10.218.3 MB2026-10-22sha256:95a7be40acad…

Security report (Trivy)

D· 9/1007 fixable · rebuild clears them

Vulnerability detail

step-issuer 0.12.0 · 11 CVE
CVESeverityPackageInstalledFixed inTitle
CVE-2026-116587HIGHgithub.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4v4.1.44.1.6github.com/go-jose/go-jose: go-jose: Denial of Service via crafted RSA parameters in JWKs
CVE-2026-62290HIGHgithub.com/cert-manager/cert-managerv1.20.11.19.6, 1.20.3cert-manager: Direct ACME Challenge resources can bypass Issuer DNS01 solver policy and use ClusterIssuer DNS credentials
CVE-2026-116587HIGHgithub.com/go-jose/go-jose/v3v3.0.5— not fixablegithub.com/go-jose/go-jose: go-jose: Denial of Service via crafted RSA parameters in JWKs
CVE-2026-114437MEDIUMgithub.com/go-chi/chi/v5v5.2.55.4.0github.com/go-chi/chi: chi: client IP spoofing via unverified direct connection in ClientIPFromXFF middleware
CVE-2026-116585MEDIUMgithub.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4v4.1.44.1.5github.com/go-jose/go-jose: go-jose: Denial of Service via empty ciphertext buffer during JWE decryption
CVE-2026-116586MEDIUMgithub.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4v4.1.44.1.5github.com/go-jose/go-jose: go-jose: Denial of Service via deeply nested JSON parsing
CVE-2026-116585MEDIUMgithub.com/go-jose/go-jose/v3v3.0.5— not fixablegithub.com/go-jose/go-jose: go-jose: Denial of Service via empty ciphertext buffer during JWE decryption
CVE-2026-116586MEDIUMgithub.com/go-jose/go-jose/v3v3.0.5— not fixablegithub.com/go-jose/go-jose: go-jose: Denial of Service via deeply nested JSON parsing
CVE-2026-78661UNKNOWNgolang.org/x/netv0.60.00.62.0When coalescing adjacent text nodes in addText and fosterParent, appen ...
CVE-2026-97045UNKNOWNgolang.org/x/netv0.60.00.62.0In childTextNodesAreLiteral, walking up the tree previously stopped at ...
GO-2026-5932UNKNOWNgolang.org/x/cryptov0.57.0— not fixableThe golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp package is unmaintained, unsafe by design, and has known security issues
0
Critical
3
High
5
Medium
0
Low
3
Unknown
fixable per nightly scan · peak 183 of 115 days with any · 2026-06-29 to 2026-10-22

Pull the image

Run it directly with Docker, Podman, or any Kubernetes workload. Nonroot, read-only root filesystem, built for amd64 and arm64.

Pull (tag)

docker pull ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/step-issuer:0.12.0

Pinned by digest (recommended)

docker pull ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/step-issuer@sha256:ac6d6d22427cade688de44630af0b9ed721b245cb8fef98f507c6ec072024226

Tags

0.12.00.12.0-amd640.12.0-arm64

Images are tagged by app version (never :latest): a multi-arch index plus per-arch tags.

App version
0.12.0
Architectures
amd64, arm64
Runs as
nonroot (uid 1001)
Root filesystem
read-only
License
Apache-2.0

Verify the supply chain

This image is cosign-signed and carries an SPDX SBOM and a SLSA build-provenance attestation on the same digest. Check all three yourself:

# 1. signature — built and signed by QuenchWorks CI
cosign verify ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/step-issuer:0.12.0 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

# 2. SLSA build provenance — which workflow built it, from what
cosign verify-attestation --type https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/step-issuer:0.12.0 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

# 3. SPDX SBOM — the package inventory
cosign verify-attestation --type https://spdx.dev/Document/v2.3 ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/step-issuer:0.12.0 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

See the SBOM & provenance guide for reading the SBOM and using these checks in CI.

Transparency

Every image carries its SBOM and provenance as attestations on the same digest, publicly verifiable with the commands above (they check the package and the Sigstore transparency log, Rekor).

Upstream project: https://smallstep.com/docs/step-ca/