mastodon-streaming

Image · Apps & productivity · standard · v4.7.3

D 10cosign signedSPDX SBOMSLSA provenanceamd64 · arm64Rebuilt 2026-10-22

The Mastodon streaming API server (Node), the companion to the mastodon image, on a hardened Wolfi nodejs-24 runtime with only the streaming workspace's production dependencies. Nonroot, read-only rootfs. Image only, no chart; the mastodon chart deploys it.

Image

ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/mastodon-streaming:4.7.3

Signed

cosign keyless

SBOM

SPDX, on digest

Provenance

SLSA build

Architectures

amd64, arm64

Runs as

nonroot (uid 1001)

Root filesystem

read-only

Image size

60.8 MB

Published versions

1 tag

Each tag is a multi-arch index (amd64 + arm64) pinned by digest. Tagged by version, never :latest.

Version	Size	Published	Digest
4.7.3latest	60.8 MB	2026-10-22	sha256:f3befe71fe6d…

Security report (Trivy)

D· 0/10010 fixable · rebuild clears them

Vulnerability detail

mastodon-streaming 4.7.3 · 10 CVE

CVE	Severity	Package	Installed	Fixed in	Title
CVE-2026-109383	HIGH	undici	8.10.2	6.29.1, 7.30.1, 8.12.2	undici: undici: Certificate validation bypass via dropped TLS options in Agent
CVE-2026-109829	HIGH	undici	8.10.2	7.30.1, 8.12.2	undici: undici: Cache poisoning and information disclosure via improper cross-origin redirect caching
CVE-2026-109869	HIGH	undici	8.10.2	6.29.1, 7.30.1, 8.12.2	undici: undici: Denial of Service via unhandled stream error on excessive content encodings
CVE-2026-111181	HIGH	body-parser	2.3.0	2.4.0, 1.20.9	body-parser: body-parser: Denial of Service via unhandled decompression stream error
CVE-2026-87018	HIGH	undici	8.10.2	6.29.1, 7.30.1, 8.12.2	undici: undici: Denial of Service via TLS renegotiation with mismatched certificate
CVE-2026-109841	MEDIUM	undici	8.10.2	7.30.1, 8.12.2	undici: undici: Subresource Integrity bypass via non-lowercase algorithm tokens
CVE-2026-109924	MEDIUM	undici	8.10.2	6.29.1, 7.30.1, 8.12.2	undici: undici: Denial of Service via memory exhaustion in EventSource client
CVE-2026-109932	MEDIUM	undici	8.10.2	6.29.1, 7.30.1, 8.12.2	undici: undici: Denial of Service via unbounded WebSocket PONG buffering
CVE-2026-110816	MEDIUM	qs	6.16.0	6.16.1	qs: qs: Denial of Service via unhandled exception during array serialization
CVE-2026-87029	MEDIUM	undici	8.10.2	7.30.1, 8.12.2	undici: undici: Denial of Service via unhandled exception in decompress interceptor

Critical

High

Medium

Low

Unknown

fixable per nightly scan · peak 122 of 115 days with any · 2026-06-29 to 2026-10-22

Pull the image

Run it directly with Docker, Podman, or any Kubernetes workload. Nonroot, read-only root filesystem, built for amd64 and arm64.

Pull (tag)

docker pull ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/mastodon-streaming:4.7.3

Tags

4.7.34.7.3-amd644.7.3-arm64

Images are tagged by app version (never :latest): a multi-arch index plus per-arch tags.

App version: 4.7.3
Architectures: amd64, arm64
Runs as: nonroot (uid 1001)
Root filesystem: read-only
License: AGPL-3.0

Verify the supply chain

This image is cosign-signed and carries an SPDX SBOM and a SLSA build-provenance attestation on the same digest. Check all three yourself:

# 1. signature — built and signed by QuenchWorks CI
cosign verify ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/mastodon-streaming:4.7.3 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

# 2. SLSA build provenance — which workflow built it, from what
cosign verify-attestation --type https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/mastodon-streaming:4.7.3 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

# 3. SPDX SBOM — the package inventory
cosign verify-attestation --type https://spdx.dev/Document/v2.3 ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/mastodon-streaming:4.7.3 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

See the SBOM & provenance guide for reading the SBOM and using these checks in CI.

Transparency

Every image carries its SBOM and provenance as attestations on the same digest, publicly verifiable with the commands above (they check the package and the Sigstore transparency log, Rekor).

View package

Upstream project: https://joinmastodon.org