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QuenchWorks

mastodon

Image · Apps & productivity · standard · v4.7.3

D 8cosign signedSPDX SBOMSLSA provenanceamd64 · arm64Rebuilt 2026-10-22

Mastodon, the federated social network server (web and sidekiq). Built from the release tag on a hardened Wolfi ruby-4.0 runtime with every gem compiled from source against Wolfi's libvips, libpq, ICU and libxml2, and the web assets compiled at build time, so no Node ships at runtime. Nonroot, read-only rootfs; PostgreSQL and Redis are external. The streaming server is a separate image.

Current digest (deployed by the chart)

sha256:75985a180d492ab536e7b4407b660326660e4a0e9cdec7942c23e526b8fdca33

Signatures, the SBOM, and provenance all attach to this digest. Pin to it for reproducible, tamper-evident pulls.

Image
ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/mastodon:4.7.3
Signed
cosign keyless
SBOM
SPDX, on digest
Provenance
SLSA build
Architectures
amd64, arm64
Runs as
nonroot (uid 1001)
Root filesystem
read-only
Image size
340.1 MB

Published versions

1 tag

Each tag is a multi-arch index (amd64 + arm64) pinned by digest. Tagged by version, never :latest.

VersionSizePublishedDigest
4.7.3latest340.1 MB2026-10-22sha256:75985a180d49…

Security report (Trivy)

D· 29/1008 fixable · rebuild clears them

Vulnerability detail

mastodon 4.7.3 · 8 CVE
CVESeverityPackageInstalledFixed inTitle
GHSA-5v64-555j-wjxmHIGHrack3.2.7~> 2.2.25, ~> 3.1.23, >= 3.2.8Multipart parser retains parsed data in its scan buffer, allowing denial of service via memory exhaustion.
CVE-2026-116695MEDIUMcrass1.0.71.0.8crass: crass: CSS injection via malformed URL token parsing
GHSA-2j8w-xcrc-x985MEDIUMrack3.2.7~> 3.1.23, >= 3.2.8Rack::Request#host_with_port and `#base_url` return an invalid `Host` verbatim, enabling URL and allowlist bypass
GHSA-5287-hmjh-qmqqMEDIUMpghero4.0.1>= 4.1.0Insecure direct object reference (IDOR)
GHSA-wvg4-6p58-3gh3MEDIUMrack3.2.7~> 2.2.25, ~> 3.1.23, >= 3.2.8Rack::Static `header_rules` bypass via unnormalized dot segments in the request path
GHSA-p8x9-v4hv-2w4gLOWrack3.2.7~> 2.2.25, ~> 3.1.23, >= 3.2.8Multipart boundary guard skips a leading empty or quoted `boundary` parameter, allowing parser differentials and WAF bypass
GHSA-pq4g-8rxf-4g29UNKNOWNcrass1.0.7>= 1.0.8Incorrect tokenization of bad URLs enables CSS sanitizer bypass
GHSA-wgw9-qhqg-8hv5UNKNOWNsanitize7.0.0>= 7.0.1CSS property and URL allowlists can be bypassed via CSS nesting in stylesheets
0
Critical
1
High
4
Medium
1
Low
2
Unknown
fixable per nightly scan · peak 163 of 115 days with any · 2026-06-29 to 2026-10-22

Pull the image

Run it directly with Docker, Podman, or any Kubernetes workload. Nonroot, read-only root filesystem, built for amd64 and arm64.

Pull (tag)

docker pull ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/mastodon:4.7.3

Pinned by digest (recommended)

docker pull ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/mastodon@sha256:75985a180d492ab536e7b4407b660326660e4a0e9cdec7942c23e526b8fdca33

Tags

4.7.34.7.3-amd644.7.3-arm64

Images are tagged by app version (never :latest): a multi-arch index plus per-arch tags.

App version
4.7.3
Architectures
amd64, arm64
Runs as
nonroot (uid 1001)
Root filesystem
read-only
License
AGPL-3.0

Verify the supply chain

This image is cosign-signed and carries an SPDX SBOM and a SLSA build-provenance attestation on the same digest. Check all three yourself:

# 1. signature — built and signed by QuenchWorks CI
cosign verify ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/mastodon:4.7.3 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

# 2. SLSA build provenance — which workflow built it, from what
cosign verify-attestation --type https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/mastodon:4.7.3 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

# 3. SPDX SBOM — the package inventory
cosign verify-attestation --type https://spdx.dev/Document/v2.3 ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/mastodon:4.7.3 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

See the SBOM & provenance guide for reading the SBOM and using these checks in CI.

Transparency

Every image carries its SBOM and provenance as attestations on the same digest, publicly verifiable with the commands above (they check the package and the Sigstore transparency log, Rekor).

View the Helm chartView package

Upstream project: https://joinmastodon.org