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linkerd-cni

Image · Coordination & mesh · standard · v1.7.0

C 6cosign signedSPDX SBOMSLSA provenanceamd64 · arm64Rebuilt 2026-10-22

Linkerd's CNI plugin (the alternative to the proxy-init init container), its installer and the Rust cni-repair-controller, built from source from the linkerd/linkerd2-proxy-init cni-plugin tag with upstream's image layout, so the linkerd2-cni chart runs it unchanged. A privileged node agent by design.

Current digest (deployed by the chart)

sha256:235cb8ded647e6f69771db08fe80befc4ae3225dd10757f833dbfef9a95aeafb

Signatures, the SBOM, and provenance all attach to this digest. Pin to it for reproducible, tamper-evident pulls.

Image
ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/linkerd-cni:1.7.0
Signed
cosign keyless
SBOM
SPDX, on digest
Provenance
SLSA build
Architectures
amd64, arm64
Runs as
nonroot (uid 1001)
Root filesystem
read-only
Image size
19.3 MB

Published versions

1 tag

Each tag is a multi-arch index (amd64 + arm64) pinned by digest. Tagged by version, never :latest.

VersionSizePublishedDigest
1.7.0latest19.3 MB2026-10-22sha256:235cb8ded647…

Security report (Trivy)

C· 59/1006 fixable · rebuild clears them

Vulnerability detail

linkerd-cni 1.7.0 · 6 CVE
CVESeverityPackageInstalledFixed inTitle
GHSA-c8m5-c952-6cm4MEDIUMrustls0.23.450.23.46, 0.24.0-dev.2Rustls: Session Debug formatting exposes TLS master secrets and resumption PSKs
GHSA-h2v8-394m-p7vvLOWrustls0.23.450.23.46, 0.24.0-dev.2Rustls: Brotli certificate decompression can allocate an attacker-controlled amount of memory up to 1 GiB before authentication.
GHSA-vp88-798v-h67fLOWrustls0.23.450.23.46, 0.24.0-dev.2rustls: ECH rejection can expose buffered application data to authenticated outer server before `ech_required` alert
GHSA-w44r-93j7-qv28LOWrustls0.23.450.23.46, 0.24.0-dev.2rustls: An unauthenticated ServerHello poisons the per-name key-exchange record, so later ClientHellos carry only a classical X25519 share
CVE-2026-78661UNKNOWNgolang.org/x/netv0.60.00.62.0When coalescing adjacent text nodes in addText and fosterParent, appen ...
CVE-2026-97045UNKNOWNgolang.org/x/netv0.60.00.62.0In childTextNodesAreLiteral, walking up the tree previously stopped at ...
0
Critical
0
High
1
Medium
3
Low
2
Unknown
fixable per nightly scan · peak 312 of 115 days with any · 2026-06-29 to 2026-10-22

Pull the image

Run it directly with Docker, Podman, or any Kubernetes workload. Nonroot, read-only root filesystem, built for amd64 and arm64.

Pull (tag)

docker pull ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/linkerd-cni:1.7.0

Pinned by digest (recommended)

docker pull ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/linkerd-cni@sha256:235cb8ded647e6f69771db08fe80befc4ae3225dd10757f833dbfef9a95aeafb

Tags

1.7.01.7.0-amd641.7.0-arm64

Images are tagged by app version (never :latest): a multi-arch index plus per-arch tags.

App version
1.7.0
Architectures
amd64, arm64
Runs as
nonroot (uid 1001)
Root filesystem
read-only
License
Apache-2.0

Verify the supply chain

This image is cosign-signed and carries an SPDX SBOM and a SLSA build-provenance attestation on the same digest. Check all three yourself:

# 1. signature — built and signed by QuenchWorks CI
cosign verify ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/linkerd-cni:1.7.0 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

# 2. SLSA build provenance — which workflow built it, from what
cosign verify-attestation --type https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/linkerd-cni:1.7.0 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

# 3. SPDX SBOM — the package inventory
cosign verify-attestation --type https://spdx.dev/Document/v2.3 ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/linkerd-cni:1.7.0 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

See the SBOM & provenance guide for reading the SBOM and using these checks in CI.

Transparency

Every image carries its SBOM and provenance as attestations on the same digest, publicly verifiable with the commands above (they check the package and the Sigstore transparency log, Rekor).

View the Helm chartView package

Upstream project: https://linkerd.io