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QuenchWorks

emissary

Image · Gateway · standard · v4.1.0

F 12cosign signedSPDX SBOMSLSA provenanceamd64 · arm64Rebuilt 2026-10-22

Emissary-ingress, the CNCF Kubernetes API gateway built on Envoy (Mapping, Host and Listener CRDs, auth, rate limiting, canaries). Envoy 1.37 from Wolfi, the Python control plane (diagd) and the Go busyambassador built from source; upstream layout and uid 8888. Pairs with emissary-apiext.

Current digest (deployed by the chart)

sha256:adaf54b9c1332801700792193fd88ad12245d0fa71e259fff091f3cd93a1800a

Signatures, the SBOM, and provenance all attach to this digest. Pin to it for reproducible, tamper-evident pulls.

Signed
cosign keyless
SBOM
SPDX, on digest
Provenance
SLSA build
Architectures
amd64, arm64
Runs as
nonroot (uid 1001)
Root filesystem
read-only
Image size
89.3 MB

Published versions

1 tag

Each tag is a multi-arch index (amd64 + arm64) pinned by digest. Tagged by version, never :latest.

VersionSizePublishedDigest
4.1.0latest89.3 MB2026-10-22sha256:adaf54b9c133…

Security report (Trivy)

F· 0/10011 fixable · rebuild clears them

Vulnerability detail

emissary 4.1.0 · 12 CVE
CVESeverityPackageInstalledFixed inTitle
CVE-2026-111497CRITICALenvoy-1.371.37.1-r31.37.8-r0brotli: Out-of-Bounds Write in Google Brotli Decoder
CVE-2026-111943HIGHpy3-pip-wheel26.2.2-r026.2.2-r2crypto/x509: golang: crypto/x509: Man-in-the-middle attacks via untrusted intermediate certificates
CVE-2026-114613HIGHpy3-pip-wheel26.2.2-r026.2.2-r1msgpack: msgpack: Denial of Service via memory leak during map deserialization
CVE-2026-114583MEDIUMpython-3.133.13.16_git20261016-r13.13.18_git20261030-r0tarfile.tar_filter could be bypassed using crafted link entries, inclu ...
CVE-2026-114583MEDIUMpython-3.13-base3.13.16_git20261016-r13.13.18_git20261030-r0tarfile.tar_filter could be bypassed using crafted link entries, inclu ...
CVE-2026-115557MEDIUMpython-3.133.13.16_git20261016-r13.13.18_git20261030-r0Python has added a denylist for known compromised certificates to the ...
CVE-2026-115557MEDIUMpython-3.13-base3.13.16_git20261016-r13.13.18_git20261030-r0Python has added a denylist for known compromised certificates to the ...
CVE-2026-12345MEDIUMpython-3.133.13.16_git20261016-r13.13.18_git20261030-r0python: python: Arbitrary file deletion via race condition during temporary directory cleanup
CVE-2026-12345MEDIUMpython-3.13-base3.13.16_git20261016-r13.13.18_git20261030-r0python: python: Arbitrary file deletion via race condition during temporary directory cleanup
CVE-2025-1767MEDIUMk8s.io/kubernetesv1.30.3— not fixablekubelet: GitRepo Volume Inadvertent Local Repository Access
CVE-2026-78661UNKNOWNgolang.org/x/netv0.60.00.62.0When coalescing adjacent text nodes in addText and fosterParent, appen ...
CVE-2026-97045UNKNOWNgolang.org/x/netv0.60.00.62.0In childTextNodesAreLiteral, walking up the tree previously stopped at ...
1
Critical
2
High
7
Medium
0
Low
2
Unknown
fixable per nightly scan · peak 343 of 115 days with any · 2026-06-29 to 2026-10-22

Pull the image

Run it directly with Docker, Podman, or any Kubernetes workload. Nonroot, read-only root filesystem, built for amd64 and arm64.

Pull (tag)

docker pull ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/emissary:4.1.0

Pinned by digest (recommended)

docker pull ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/emissary@sha256:adaf54b9c1332801700792193fd88ad12245d0fa71e259fff091f3cd93a1800a

Tags

4.1.04.1.0-amd644.1.0-arm64

Images are tagged by app version (never :latest): a multi-arch index plus per-arch tags.

App version
4.1.0
Architectures
amd64, arm64
Runs as
nonroot (uid 1001)
Root filesystem
read-only
License
Apache-2.0

Verify the supply chain

This image is cosign-signed and carries an SPDX SBOM and a SLSA build-provenance attestation on the same digest. Check all three yourself:

# 1. signature — built and signed by QuenchWorks CI
cosign verify ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/emissary:4.1.0 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

# 2. SLSA build provenance — which workflow built it, from what
cosign verify-attestation --type https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/emissary:4.1.0 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

# 3. SPDX SBOM — the package inventory
cosign verify-attestation --type https://spdx.dev/Document/v2.3 ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/emissary:4.1.0 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

See the SBOM & provenance guide for reading the SBOM and using these checks in CI.

Transparency

Every image carries its SBOM and provenance as attestations on the same digest, publicly verifiable with the commands above (they check the package and the Sigstore transparency log, Rekor).

Upstream project: https://emissary-ingress.dev