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QuenchWorks

ceph

Image · Storage & platform · standard · v20.2.4

D 16cosign signedSPDX SBOMSLSA provenanceamd64 · arm64Rebuilt 2026-10-22

Ceph, the distributed object, block and file store (mon, mgr, osd, mds, radosgw, rbd-mirror, exporter), from Wolfi's ceph-20 (Tentacle) packages without cephadm. Laid out like upstream's image for Rook. Image only; the Rook chart is next.

Signed
cosign keyless
SBOM
SPDX, on digest
Provenance
SLSA build
Architectures
amd64, arm64
Runs as
nonroot (uid 1001)
Root filesystem
read-only
Image size
386.0 MB

Published versions

1 tag

Each tag is a multi-arch index (amd64 + arm64) pinned by digest. Tagged by version, never :latest.

VersionSizePublishedDigest
20.2.4latest386.0 MB2026-10-22sha256:dda8fb686abf…

Security report (Trivy)

D· 0/10016 fixable · rebuild clears them

Vulnerability detail

ceph 20.2.4 · 12 CVE
CVESeverityPackageInstalledFixed inTitle
CVE-2026-111943HIGHpy3-pip-wheel26.2.2-r026.2.2-r2crypto/x509: golang: crypto/x509: Man-in-the-middle attacks via untrusted intermediate certificates
CVE-2026-114613HIGHpy3-pip-wheel26.2.2-r026.2.2-r1msgpack: msgpack: Denial of Service via memory leak during map deserialization
CVE-2026-119194HIGHpyasn10.6.40.6.5pyasn1: pyasn1: Denial of Service via hash collisions in schemaless decoding
CVE-2026-119195HIGHpyasn10.6.40.6.5pyasn1: pyasn1: Denial of Service via quadratic processing of fragmented ASN.1 data
CVE-2026-119196HIGHpyasn10.6.40.6.5pyasn1: pyasn1: Denial of Service via constructed bit string decoding
CVE-2026-119197HIGHpyasn10.6.40.6.5pyasn1: pyasn1: Denial of Service via quadratic complexity in binary REAL decoding
CVE-2025-12781MEDIUMpython-3.12-base3.12.15-r43.12.16-r2cpython: base64.b64decode() always accepts "+/" characters, despite setting altchars
CVE-2025-15366MEDIUMpython-3.12-base3.12.15-r43.12.16-r2cpython: IMAP command injection in user-controlled commands
CVE-2025-15367MEDIUMpython-3.12-base3.12.15-r43.12.16-r2cpython: POP3 command injection in user-controlled commands
CVE-2026-12345MEDIUMpython-3.12-base3.12.15-r43.12.16-r0python: python: Arbitrary file deletion via race condition during temporary directory cleanup
CVE-2026-3446MEDIUMpython-3.12-base3.12.15-r43.12.16-r2python: Python base64: Incomplete data decoding due to premature stop at padding
CVE-2026-6019MEDIUMpython-3.12-base3.12.15-r43.12.16-r2python: Python: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in http.cookies module
0
Critical
10
High
6
Medium
0
Low
0
Unknown
fixable per nightly scan · peak 21 of 115 days with any · 2026-06-29 to 2026-10-22

Pull the image

Run it directly with Docker, Podman, or any Kubernetes workload. Nonroot, read-only root filesystem, built for amd64 and arm64.

Pull (tag)

docker pull ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/ceph:20.2.4

Tags

20.2.420.2.4-amd6420.2.4-arm64

Images are tagged by app version (never :latest): a multi-arch index plus per-arch tags.

App version
20.2.4
Architectures
amd64, arm64
Runs as
nonroot (uid 1001)
Root filesystem
read-only
License
LGPL-2.1

Verify the supply chain

This image is cosign-signed and carries an SPDX SBOM and a SLSA build-provenance attestation on the same digest. Check all three yourself:

# 1. signature — built and signed by QuenchWorks CI
cosign verify ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/ceph:20.2.4 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

# 2. SLSA build provenance — which workflow built it, from what
cosign verify-attestation --type https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/ceph:20.2.4 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

# 3. SPDX SBOM — the package inventory
cosign verify-attestation --type https://spdx.dev/Document/v2.3 ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/ceph:20.2.4 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

See the SBOM & provenance guide for reading the SBOM and using these checks in CI.

Transparency

Every image carries its SBOM and provenance as attestations on the same digest, publicly verifiable with the commands above (they check the package and the Sigstore transparency log, Rekor).

Upstream project: https://ceph.io